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1. Introduction 
A fundamental concern in modern finance research is evaluating the impact that 
financing frictions have on real corporate activity.  One key challenge facing financing constraint 
studies is distinguishing financing effects from other explanations that can also generate finance-
investment correlations.  In particular, several studies raise concerns about the widely used 
method – pioneered by Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988) – of drawing inference about 
financing constraints from fixed investment-cash flow sensitivities, in part because of the 
difficulty of adequately controlling for productivity shocks.1  As a consequence, a number of 
recent studies use alternative approaches to identify constraints that do not hinge on standard 
investment-cash flow regressions (e.g., Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach, 2004; Hovakimian 
and Titman, 2006; Rauh, 2006; Fee, Hadlock, and Pierce, 2009).  Although these efforts, taken 
together, provide strong evidence that financing constraints “matter”, they offer limited evidence 
on the different firm policies most affected by capital market imperfections.  Notably, the 
majority of this literature continues to focus almost exclusively on fixed capital investment, 
thereby overlooking the effects financing constraints have on other firm activities, some of which 
are critical to firm- and economy-wide growth and might be even more susceptible to financing 
difficulties.  
In this paper, we make progress on identifying the presence of binding financing 
constraints, and on understanding how finance affects non-traditional real firm activities, by 
focusing on both a source and use of funds ignored in almost all prior studies.  Specifically, our 
primary tests are based on the sensitivity of firm investment in intangible capital (research and 
																																								 																				
1 For example, see Kaplan and Zingales (1997), Erickson and Whited (2000), Alti (2003), Moyen (2004), and Chen 
and Chen (2011).  Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (2000) provide a defense of the investment-cash flow 
methodology, and several studies improve on standard measures of Tobin’s Q in order to better control for 
investment opportunities, including Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995) and Carpenter and Guariglia (2008). 
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development (R&D)) to the cash proceeds generated by the sale of tangible fixed assets.  This 
approach builds on the insight in Hovakimian and Titman (2006) that a fixed investment response 
to asset sale proceeds provides relatively clean evidence of financing frictions because asset sale 
proceeds (unlike cash flow and other financial variables) are not positively associated with 
investment opportunities. We argue that examining the link between asset sale proceeds and 
intangible investment offers an even stronger test of financing constraints because there is no 
obvious alternative to a financing channel that connects fixed asset sales and corporate R&D 
investment. Not only are cash inflows from asset sales negatively correlated with proxies for 
investment opportunities (Q and sales growth) and other financing sources (cash flow and new 
stock/debt issues), as Hovakimian and Titman (2006) note, but asset sale proceeds are also 
negatively correlated with both contemporaneous and future investment in R&D.  Thus, there 
appears to be no systematic information about R&D investment opportunities in asset sale 
proceeds, in which case a positive R&D-asset sales sensitivity cannot readily be dismissed based 
solely on inadequate demand control.  Furthermore, while equipment replacement can potentially 
rationalize a positive connection between asset sale proceeds and fixed investment, there is no 
corresponding mechanical link between the sale of tangible assets and firm spending on R&D. 
In addition to providing a sharper test of binding financing constraints, studying the link 
between asset sales and R&D offers novel and particularly relevant evidence on where capital 
market imperfections are likely to have the most important effects in modern firms.  Although a 
vast number of studies apply numerous alternative tests to evaluate how access to finance affects 
fixed investment2, empirical evidence on the impact of financing frictions on R&D investment is 
																																								 																				
2 A non-exhaustive list of examples includes Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988), Bond and Meghir (1994), 
Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995), Hubbard, Kashyap, and Whited (1995), Hovakimian and Titman (2006), Rauh 
(2006), Almeida and Campello (2007), Ağca and Mozumdar (2008), Ascioglu, Hegde, and McDermott (2008), 
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remarkably limited and the findings are far from conclusive.  The lack of attention to R&D is 
surprising, both because there are strong theoretical reasons to think that intangible investments 
like R&D are more susceptible to financing difficulties than other types of investment (e.g., 
Himmelberg and Petersen, 1994; Hall and Lerner, 2010)3, and because corporate spending on 
R&D has increased sharply over the past three decades and now substantially exceeds fixed 
investment in a large fraction of US firms.  Figure 1 plots the levels of R&D and fixed 
investment in our sampled firms.  In contrast to the steep rise in R&D expenditures, particularly 
among younger firms, fixed investment has declined steadily and is now a much less significant 
use of funds.  This shift toward R&D investment indicates that it is increasingly important to 
look beyond capital expenditures to understand how financing frictions influence real investment 
decisions in modern firms.  Furthermore, R&D is a key input for innovation, an important 
determinant of productivity growth, and a central feature of the endogenous growth literature 
(e.g., Romer, 1990; Aghion and Howitt, 1992).  Evidence that financing constraints impact 
corporate R&D spending can therefore provide insights into the causal channels that connect 
finance and economic growth.  
Focusing on the intersection between tangible divestitures and intangible investment is 
also of interest because there is little direct evidence that firms use asset sales proceeds to 
support corporate investment.  Asset sales can provide valuable (albeit limited) funding for 
innovative firms facing a high cost of external funds, in part because information asymmetry 
often contributes to these firms' financing frictions and fixed assets may be easier to value than 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																																			
Guariglia (2008), Carpenter and Guariglia (2008), and Lewellen and Lewellen (2010).  Hubbard (1998) and Stein 
(2003) review portions of this literature. 
3 Notably, R&D projects are difficult to finance with debt because they offer little or no collateral value and often 
have skewed and highly variable returns (Solt, 1993; Garlappi, 2004).  Additionally, information asymmetry 
associated with R&D investment projects is potentially severe, in part because firms have incentives to maintain 
secrecy from competitors, increasing the cost of external funds (Kamien and Schwartz, 1978; Myers and Majluf,  
1984). 
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the overall firm.  This is not to say that fixed asset sales represent a major source of funding for 
intangible investment; nor does it suggest that R&D financing considerations are the primary 
motivation for fixed asset divestitures.  Rather, at the margin, firms facing binding financing 
constraints should optimally use some fraction of the cash inflows generated by fixed asset 
divestitures for value-enhancing investments that would otherwise be foregone due to high 
financing costs.4 Although the financing potential from asset sales has long been discussed (e.g., 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1992; Lang, Poulsen, and Stulz, 1995), and several studies show that 
divestitures often follow periods when liquidity concerns are pronounced (e.g., Ofek, 1993; 
Campello, Graham, and Harvey, 2010), we are aware of no evidence linking asset sales and 
investment in intangible capital.   
Our tests are based on a broad sample of Compustat firms between 1980 and 2008.  Our 
investment regressions are in the spirit of Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988) and the related 
literature but differ in three important ways: i) we add cash proceeds from asset sales as a source 
of finance, ii) we control for the potential confounding impact funds raised from new stock and 
debt issues have on R&D, and iii) we include changes in net working capital to control for firm 
efforts to keep R&D smooth by managing liquid assets.5  We use both instrumental variables 
regressions employing the generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator and a switching 
model (estimated via maximum likelihood) that endogenously sorts firms into constrained and 
																																								 																				
4 Supporting the plausibility of asset sale proceeds being used for intangible investment, reports from the press 
suggest that, along with more commonly cited uses such as debt repayment, firms sometimes explicitly point to 
R&D funding as a use of asset sale proceeds. To cite a couple of examples: “Pharmacia AB will sell all its office and 
industrial properties in Uppsala and Umea to raise capital for investments in research and development as well as 
marketing” (Journal of Commerce, Nov. 14, 1988); “MagneTek, Inc. sells drive products business to 
Yaskawa…Proceeds will be used for R&D, acquisitions, and debt reduction” (PR Newswire, Jan. 29, 2001).	
5 Most spending on R&D consists of wages to skilled labor (e.g., scientists, software developers, and engineers), so 
cutting R&D often means releasing workers with a great deal of firm-specific knowledge.  As a consequence, firms 
have strong incentives to avoid large swings (particularly large cuts) in R&D spending.  See Hall and Lerner (2010) 
for a more complete discussion of R&D adjustment costs and Brown and Petersen (2011) for recent evidence that 
firms use reserve stocks of cash to smooth R&D.    
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unconstrained groups.  In each case we find a strong, positive R&D response to cash inflows 
from asset sales, but only in the groups of firms most likely to face binding financing constraints.     
Overall, our findings offer strong evidence that capital market frictions have important 
real effects.  In particular, since R&D investment in unconstrained firms is completely 
insensitive to cash inflows from asset sales, our approach avoids the Kaplan and Zingales (1997) 
critique of studies that compare the relative magnitude of positive investment-finance 
sensitivities across all firms to identify financing constraints.  Furthermore, the robust relation 
we identify between cash proceeds from asset sales and R&D investment in constrained firms is 
consistent with quantitatively important effects from financing frictions, regardless of whether it 
is driven by firms specifically choosing to finance R&D via fixed asset sales or by them 
channeling the additional capital provided via unrelated divestitures into R&D.6 Thus, there is 
much less concern in this setting that the simultaneity of the investment and financing decisions 
will bias the inferences we can make about the reasons for a positive finance-investment 
relation.7         
Our findings contribute to an emerging literature that looks beyond the intersection of 
fixed capital investment and internally generated cash flow to evaluate the real consequences of 
financing constraints.8  In particular, the evidence on how financing frictions affect R&D 
																																								 																				
6 Hovakimian and Titman (2006) make a similar point about the link between asset sale proceeds and new capital 
spending.  
7 Nonetheless, our main findings are based on an instrumental variables approach that explicitly addresses the 
potential endogeneity of the asset sale decision.   
8 A number of different approaches have been used to test for financing constraints.  Many studies following 
Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988) use Q-models of investment to establish a link between fixed investment and 
cash flow, particularly among firms most likely, a priori, to face binding constraints.  Bond and Meghir (1994), 
Hubbard, Kashyap, and Whited (1995), Bond, Elston, Mairesse, and Mulkay (2003), and Guariglia (2008) estimate 
structural Euler equations and/or error correction models and find evidence consistent with financing constraints in 
fixed investment for some firms.  Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2004) focus on the cash flow sensitivity of 
investment in financial assets (cash reserves).  As noted above, Hovakimian and Titman (2006) study the link 
between asset sales and capital expenditures.  Rauh (2006) finds that exogenous variation on internal funds caused 
by mandatory pension contributions affects corporate investment in fixed capital. Almeida and Campello (2007) 
introduce a new test for financing constraints based on the idea that asset tangibility impacts the extent to which 
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consists primarily of a small number of conflicting studies on the R&D-cash flow sensitivity.  
For example, Hall (1992) and Himmelberg and Petersen (1994) document a positive link 
between R&D investment and internal cash flow, particularly among smaller firms.  More 
recently, Brown, Fazzari, and Petersen (2009) and Brown and Petersen (2009) find a positive 
relation between both internal and external equity finance and young-firm R&D spending in the 
US, and Martinsson (2010) and Brown, Martinsson, and Petersen (2012) document similar 
connections among new firms in parts of Europe.  On the other hand, several studies find that 
finance is relatively unimportant for R&D, including a recent study by Chen and Chen (2011) 
that reports no evidence of a significant R&D-cash flow sensitivity in recent years.9  By 
considering an internal source of finance not contaminated by demand-side effects, our study 
offers novel and more conclusive evidence that financing frictions do affect firm investment in 
R&D.      
 
2. Data and sample characteristics 
2.1. Sample construction 
To construct the sample, we start with all surviving and non-surviving firms with a US 
incorporation code and coverage in the Compustat database at any time over 1980-2008.  We 
exclude firms outside of manufacturing (SIC codes 20-39) and services (SIC 73) since most 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																																			
firms can raise external finance to fund additional investment in tangible assets and show that their approach is not 
appropriate for R&D investment.  Fee, Hadlock, and Pierce (2009) identify financing constraints by examining the 
intersection between advertising expenditures by multinational firms and the level of their foreign cash flow.  
9 Bhagat and Welch (1995) and Ryan and Wiggins (2002) actually find some evidence of a negative relation 
between the levels of operating cash flow and R&D investment in US firms.  However, they measure cash flow net 
of R&D expenditures (which can be highly negative for R&D intensive firms early in their lifecycle when internally 
generated cash flows are often insufficient to fully fund their substantial R&D expenses), and they do not control for 
firm use of external finance which can bias inference about the importance of finance for R&D (Brown, Martinsson, 
and Petersen, 2012).  Rauh (2006) examines R&D when estimating how investment responds to exogenous shocks 
to internal funds caused by mandatory pension contributions.  However, the “natural experiment” approach he 
employs may not be very informative about financing constraints on R&D because high adjustment costs can limit 
the R&D response to transitory finance shocks.  Indeed, Rauh (2006) finds strong evidence that capital spending 
responds to cash shortfalls but no evidence of an R&D response. 
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R&D takes place in these sectors.  Our sample, therefore, includes the three-digit SIC high-tech 
industries (283, 357, 366, 367, 382, 384, and 737) that account for the majority of US R&D (see 
Brown, Fazzari, and Petersen, 2009).  We then eliminate any firm without at least one positive 
asset sale and four positive R&D observations during the sample period.  Most of the eliminated 
firms do not report any information on R&D expenses (i.e., R&D is reported as ‘missing’ rather 
than ‘zero’).  Specifically, across all firms in the industries and time period we study that have at 
least four years of Compustat data, 27% report no positive R&D observations whatsoever, while 
only 9% report between one and three years of R&D. Requiring four years of reported R&D 
expenses is important for our study because: i) our focus on the potential for a positive R&D-
asset sale sensitivity is only relevant for firms with active R&D programs, and ii) some of our 
estimation approaches require both differenced and lagged values of regression variables.10  
Finally, we exclude all firm-years in which merger and acquisition activity accounts for 50% or 
more of sales and any firm-years in which sales, the book value of assets, or gross property, 
plant, and equipment are less than or equal to zero.  The final sample consists of 3,156 firms and 
36,923 firm-year observations.  Appendix A contains detailed variable definitions. 
 
2.2. Financial constraint subsamples  
We rely on widely used criteria to sort firms into ex ante constraint groupings.  Our 
primary ex ante constraint split is based on firm age, which follows a number of recent studies 
(e.g., Brown, Fazzari, and Petersen, 2009; Fee, Hadlock, and Pierce, 2009; Hadlock and Pierce, 
2010).  As these studies note, age is an especially attractive way to sort firms because it is less 
																																								 																				
10 The main results are qualitatively similar if we relax the restriction that requires four R&D observations, insist on 
at least one “big” asset sale during the period (e.g., at least 1% of the book value of assets), look only at high-tech 
firms (like Brown, Fazzari, and Petersen, 2009), or focus only on firms in manufacturing (like Hovakimian and 
Titman, 2006).  
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endogenous than other commonly used sorting criteria, and there are several reasons to expect 
that younger firms face more severe financing frictions than older firms.  In particular, young 
firms are more likely to suffer from especially severe information problems and are in a phase of 
their lifecycle when investment opportunities often exceed internally generated funds.  We 
define firm age as the number of years since the firm first appears in Compustat with a stock 
price.  We then find an average age for each firm over the sample period and classify firms as 
“young” if their average age is 10 years or less and as “mature” if it is 20 years or more.  
Additionally, we confirm that our findings are robust to alternative cutoff points, such as 
considering firms young if their average age is 15 years or less and mature otherwise or sorting 
firms into young and mature categories based on how their average age compares to the sample 
median age.  
We also sort firms based on size and dividend payout.  Our main size split considers 
firms “small” if their average net sales during the sample period fall in the bottom quartile of 
sampled firms, and “large” if average sales are in the top quartile. Dividing the sample in this 
way prevents firms of roughly equivalent sizes (on either side of the median) from being 
classified in different categories and helps handle the skewed distribution of firm size, where the 
median sales value is only $83 million.  We show that our primary results are similar if we sort 
based on sample median sales or use assets instead of sales to measure firm size.  This approach 
is based on the idea that smaller firms are more likely to face binding financing constraints than 
larger firms (e.g., Gilchrist and Himmelberg, 1995; Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach, 2004).  
Finally, we sort firms based on average payout ratios over the sample period, following the logic 
in Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988) that constrained firms should be less likely to have 
positive dividends.  As with age and size, we explore alternative approaches for identifying 
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constrained (unconstrained) firms, such as the presence of a non-positive (positive) average 
overall net payout ratio (which accounts for stock issues and buybacks in addition to dividends) 
or an average dividend payout in the bottom (top) quartile of the sample distribution.  
 
2.3. Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the full sample and separately for the young and 
mature subsamples.  We provide descriptive statistics for the small/large and low payout/high 
payout subsamples in Tables B1 and B2, respectively, in Appendix B.  These statistics are very 
similar in all key respects to the young/mature statistics reported in Table 1.  All investment and 
financing variables are scaled by the beginning-of-period book value of total assets, and all ratios 
are winsorized at the 1% level.  Since our sample is comprised entirely of firms with positive 
R&D spending, R&D values for both young and mature firms are much higher than those 
reported in studies that examine a broader set of industries and firms (and often set missing R&D 
values to zero).  Young firms have much higher Q values (reflecting greater investment 
opportunities) than their older counterparts.  On the financing side, cash flow and stock issues 
are the most important sources of finance for the firms in our sample.  Not surprisingly, cash 
flow is smaller and stock issues are larger, on average, in the young firms than in the mature 
firms.  New long-term debt issues and changes in net working capital are relatively small for 
both types of firms.  Similarly, the overall level of indebtness (long-term and short-term) is low 
for both young and mature firms.  For all of the firm characteristics in Table 1, the mean values 
are statistically different between young and mature firms at the 1% level, and the median values 
are statistically different for all variables except the change in net working capital.     
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These statistics highlight the potential for young firms to face binding financing 
constraints.  In particular, young firms have substantial R&D investment opportunities relative to 
internal funds, and they rely, at the margin, on costly external stock issues.  In contrast, mature 
firms have lower Q values and appear capable of easily covering annual R&D spending with 
internally generated cash flows.  If so, we expect only the young (constrained) firms to use some 
fraction of asset sale proceeds for R&D investment.  Like Hovakimian and Titman (2006), we do 
not require that the asset sale meet a minimum size threshold, and as a result our sample includes 
a number of firm-years with very small values for asset sales.  We also treat asset sale proceeds 
like other sources of finance and focus on the gross proceeds that fixed asset divestitures make 
available for all investment, rather than the net or residual amount that remains after new 
spending on fixed capital.  The magnitude of these gross cash inflows from asset sales in our 
sample is similar to that in Hovakimian and Titman (2006) (the average ratios they report are 
slightly larger because they scale by net fixed assets rather than by total assets).  Asset sales are 
positive (i.e., non-zero) in approximately 42% of all observations (we set asset sale proceeds to 
zero in years when Compustat reports a missing value).  In the years with positive asset sales, the 
average sale is 1.06% of existing total assets (first column of Table 1) and 18.69% of existing net 
property, plant, and equipment (not tabulated).11  Thus, asset sales are not a large source of funds 
for either young or mature firms, but when R&D-reporting firms sell assets, they often sell a 
significant fraction of existing fixed assets.  Mature firms have larger stocks of fixed assets than 
young firms and are more likely to have positive asset sales (51% of firm-years versus 38% for 
young firms), ensuring that our tests will not be skewed by a disproportionate lack of asset sales 
in the groups of firms we classify as ‘unconstrained’.   
																																								 																				
11 For comparison, in the years with positive asset sales, funds from new debt issues are, on average, 1.53% of 
existing total assets, and new stock issues generate 5.08% of total assets. 
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2.4. Time series changes in R&D and capital spending  
Figure 1 shows how the relative importance of R&D and fixed capital investment 
changes for the firms in our regression sample during the 1980-2008 period.12  We plot the 
average (winsorized) R&D- and capital spending-to-assets ratios separately for young and 
mature firms.13  In 1980 capital spending is substantially larger than R&D for both young and 
mature firms.  However, R&D ratios increase sharply during the sample period, while capital 
spending ratios decline.  The increase in R&D spending is particularly pronounced among young 
firms, and although their R&D intensity declines sharply in 2001 and never fully recovers, the 
young-firm R&D ratio at the end of the sample period is roughly four times higher than the 
corresponding fixed investment ratio (0.144 vs. 0.038).  For mature firms the increase in R&D 
intensity is steadier, and by the end of our sample the average R&D ratio is over twice as large as 
capital spending (0.093 vs. 0.040).  In sum, R&D spending is now the primary investment for a 
large fraction of publicly-traded US firms.  Given that the nature of R&D should make it even 
more susceptible to financing frictions than fixed investment, the evidence in Figure 1 suggests 
that focusing only on capital expenditures may vastly understate the influence that financing 
constraints have on investment in modern firms. 
 
																																								 																				
12 By construction our sample only includes firms that report positive R&D expenditures.  Thus, the figure shows 
the relative importance of R&D investment among positive R&D firms.  However, the trends are very similar 
(though the R&D magnitudes are slightly smaller) if we include all listed firms in the manufacturing and services 
industries during this period.  The trends are also similar if we look at median levels rather than averages. 
13 For this figure we want to report information for the full sample of firms, so we classify firms as young for the 
first fifteen years they appear in Compustat with a stock price and as mature thereafter. 
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2.5. Correlation coefficients 
Table 2 shows the correlation between asset sales, two proxies for growth opportunities 
(Q and sales growth), key financial variables (cash flow and new stock/debt issues), and 
investment in R&D and fixed capital.  The first column shows that funds from asset sales are 
negatively correlated with the proxies for growth opportunities (consistent with Hovakimian and 
Titman, 2006), with the financial variables, and, notably, with R&D.  Capital spending is the 
only variable positively correlated with funds from asset sales, perhaps because both fixed assets 
and the absolute magnitude of asset sales are larger in firms with relatively high capital spending 
ratios, and because some asset sales are almost surely associated with equipment replacement.  
The correlations show that by examining the link between asset sales and R&D, we can test for 
financing constraints and avoid a key critique of studies that focus on investment-finance 
sensitivities (Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen, 1988): namely, that because controls for 
investment demand are imperfect, a positive link between finance and investment may simply 
reflect the fact that financial variables contain information about the profitability of investment. 
 
2.6. Alternative sale motivation 
Although Table 2 shows negative correlations of asset sales with R&D investment and 
sales growth, we further examine the changes in R&D and sales following divestitures to 
confirm that shifts in product demand cannot rationalize a positive relation between R&D and 
asset sale proceeds in financially constrained firms.  One possibility is that unobserved shifts in 
demand lead constrained firms to simultaneously dispose of tangible assets in unprofitable 
business lines and increase R&D spending on new product development.  In this case we would 
expect to find larger absolute increases in R&D spending and sales in the years after constrained 
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firms sell assets.  The financing constraint explanation, on the other hand, assumes that cash 
inflows from asset sales allow R&D spending to be higher than it would have otherwise been; in 
fact, the primary impact of the sale proceeds may be to limit the decline in intangible 
investment spending.  The results in Table 3 show that R&D spending tends to grow slower for 
constrained firms in the years following asset sales – for young firms, R&D growth rates are 3-
4% lower (significant at the 1% level) in the first two years following an asset sale than in the 
years following no divestitures.  Similarly, constrained firms (young, small, and low payout) 
experience lower growth in sales in the years following a divestiture compared to years without 
an asset sale.  We find exactly the same pattern if we examine longer periods (i.e., three, four, 
and five years) following the asset sale.  These results are not consistent with constrained firms 
systematically selling assets while shifting toward more profitable product development.14 			
 
3. Empirical approach 
3.1. R&D investment regressions 
To examine whether R&D investment is sensitive, at the margin, to cash inflows from 
fixed asset sales we include the cash proceeds from the sale of property, plant, and equipment 
(AssetSales) in a standard dynamic investment model that includes controls for both investment 
opportunities and the availability of key sources of R&D financing.  Our baseline empirical 
model takes the following form: 
																																								 																				
14 Specifically, our point is not that R&D is unrelated to new product development, but that firms do not appear to be 
systematically switching from tangible production to intangible production in order to capitalize on new growth 
options.  If we have poor controls for R&D profitability, then such switching could potentially generate a positive 
connection between R&D and asset sale proceeds even in the absence of financing constraints.  The evidence in 
Table 3 is inconsistent with this alternative explanation, as is the fact that we find a positive connection between 
asset sales and R&D in constrained firms only.          
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where RDj,t is R&D spending for firm j in period t.  In the baseline specification we control for 
investment opportunities with the beginning-of-period market-to-book ratio (Tobin’s Q), but 
results are similar if we use sales growth instead of Q.  The other financing sources include 
current period cash flow, funds from new stock and new debt issues, and the period change in net 
working capital.15  While it is standard to include cash flow in regressions of this type, few 
studies control for the use of external finance and the potential for the stock of working capital to 
be an important source of R&D finance.  However, recent studies show that R&D is sensitive to 
the funds from stock issues (e.g., Brown, Fazzari, and Petersen, 2009) and that firms actively 
manage their liquid assets to keep investment smooth in the face of transitory finance shocks 
(e.g., Fazzari and Petersen, 1993; Brown and Petersen, 2011), suggesting that failure to control 
for these variables can cause misleading inference about the importance of financing constraints 
for R&D.16  In addition, some theoretical critiques of conventional investment-cash flow 
regressions (e.g., Moyen, 2004) are based on the idea that external finance is correlated with cash 
flow but omitted from the regression. 
Our primary results also include a set of year (dt) and firm (fj) fixed effects.  The firm 
effects control for all unobserved time-invariant determinants of R&D at the firm level, such as 
managerial, technological, and industry characteristics, while the year fixed effects control for 
																																								 																				
15 Following Himmelberg and Petersen (1994), we measure cash flow gross of both R&D and capital expenditures.  
Since R&D is expensed, this entails adding R&D expenses to the standard measure of net cash flow (after-tax 
income before extraordinary items plus depreciation).  
16 For example, the correlations in Table 2 show that asset sale proceeds are negatively correlated with cash flow, 
stock issues, and debt issues.  Thus, declines in these key financial variables can cause R&D to fall precisely in the 
years when asset sale proceeds are positive, in which case the primary importance of asset sale funds may be to 
mitigate the fall in R&D.  If so, a regression with no controls for other financing sources will show a negative 
relation between asset sales and R&D when, in fact, the ceteris paribus relation is positive. 
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any aggregate shocks that might impact the demand for R&D, such as changes in the cost of 
capital or macroeconomic fluctuations.  We show in Section 4.3 that our findings are robust to 
using industry-specific year effects in place of the aggregate year dummies.  In all regressions, 
standard errors are calculated with clustering at the firm level and are thus robust to within-firm 
serial correlation.  
We include both lagged R&D and lagged R&D-squared in the regression model, 
consistent with the approach in several studies that model the dynamics of R&D, as reviewed by 
Hall and Lerner (2010).  However, including lagged R&D in a regression with a firm fixed effect 
introduces the potential for dynamic panel bias in a standard within-firm estimator (Nickell, 
1981).  We address this concern by using a GMM estimator specifically designed to deal with 
dynamic panel bias.  We report initial results using a difference GMM estimator that first-
differences equation (1) to remove the firm fixed effect and then uses lagged levels of the 
regression variables as instruments for the differenced regression equation (Arellano and Bond, 
1991).  However, the difference GMM estimator is subject to potentially severe finite-sample 
biases due to weak instruments when the dependent variable is highly persistent (Blundell and 
Bond, 1998).  Given the highly persistent nature of R&D investment, we thus focus primarily on 
the results from a system GMM estimator that addresses the weak instrument problems of 
difference GMM by jointly estimating a regression of equation (1) in differences and in levels, 
using lagged levels as instruments for the regression in differences and lagged differences as 
instruments for the regression in levels (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998).  In 
addition to addressing dynamic panel bias, this approach also accounts for the simultaneity and 
potential endogeneity of the financing and investment decisions.  Several recent studies use 
similar approaches to address endogeneity concerns in situations where no obvious external 
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instruments are present (e.g., Beck and Levine, 2004; Guariglia, 2008; Carpenter and Guariglia, 
2008; Faulkender, Flannery, Hankins, and Smith, 2011).  In addition, by instrumenting with 
lagged values, this approach provides a tractable yet relatively robust and efficient way to 
address concerns about measurement error in investment equations like those we estimate 
(Almeida, Campello, and Galvao, 2010).  
 
3.2. Endogenous switching regressions  
In addition to using GMM to estimate equation (1) separately for constrained and 
unconstrained subsamples of firms, we also use an endogenous switching regression following 
Hovakimian and Titman (2006) and Almeida and Campello (2007).  The primary advantage of 
this approach is that it does not require an ex ante split of firms into constrained and 
unconstrained groupings.  Rather, it simultaneously estimates: i) the likelihood that a firm is in 
constrained or unconstrained regimes based on a vector of firm characteristics, and ii) separate 
R&D regressions for firms in the different regimes.  Both Hovakimian and Titman (2006) and 
Almeida and Campello (2007) provide detailed discussions of this estimation approach.  Briefly, 
we simultaneously estimate the following set of equations via maximum likelihood: 
RD1j,t = β1RDj,t-1 + β2RD2 j,t-1 + β3Qj,t-1 + β4AssetSalesj,t + β5CashFlowj,t + β6StkIssuesj,t + 
β7DbtIssuesj,t + β8ΔΝWCj,t + ωj + ψt + e1j,t              (2) 
RD2j,t = χ1RDj,t-1 + χ2RD2 j,t-1 + χ3Qj,t-1 + χ4AssetSalesj,t + χ5CashFlowj,t + χ6StkIssuesj,t + 
χ7DbtIssuesj,t + χ8ΔΝWCj,t + ωj + ψt + e2j,t              (3) 
y*j,t = γ1Qj,t-1 + γ2Agej,t-1 + γ3Sizej,t-1 + γ4Cashj,t-1 + γ5StDebtj,t-1 + γ6LtDebtj,t-1 +         
γ7DivDummyj,t-1 + ujt.                 (4) 
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Equations (2) and (3) allow the determinants of R&D to differ across firms endogenously 
sorted into constrained and unconstrained regimes. The structural equations mirror the baseline 
specification in equation (1), and include both firm and year fixed effects (ωj and ψt).  Our focus 
is the potential for asset sales to have a different impact on R&D in constrained firms than in 
unconstrained firms (i.e., for β4 to differ from χ4).  Equation (4) is the selection equation that 
sorts firms into constrained and unconstrained regimes in each period t.  Unlike the ex ante 
constraint groupings which are based on one firm characteristic, equation (4) uses multiple firm 
characteristics to determine the likelihood a firm is in the constrained or unconstrained regime.  
The set of firm characteristics that determines the likelihood of being in one regime or the other 
is similar to that used by Hovakimian and Titman (2006) and includes both firm size and firm 
age, which Hadlock and Pierce (2010) find to be especially important predictors of the extent of 
financing constraints.  Actual R&D by firm j at time t is given by: 
RDj,t = RD1j,t  if y*j,t < 0               (5) 
RDj,t = RD2j,t  if y*j,t >= 0, 
where y*j,t is a latent variable that measures the likelihood that the firm is in either the first or the 
second regime in each period. 
 
3.3. Empirical predictions 
We expect a positive link, at the margin, between funds from asset sales and R&D for 
firms that face binding financing constraints.  It is important to emphasize that the financing 
constraint hypothesis predicts a positive R&D-asset sales link for constrained firms only: 
unconstrained firms would have no need to use asset sale proceeds for R&D investment.  This 
prediction is valuable for a number of reasons.  In particular, to the extent that asset sales have a 
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positive impact on R&D in constrained firms but no impact in unconstrained firms, our tests for 
the influence of financing frictions bypass the Kaplan and Zingales (1997) critique of drawing 
inference about financing constraints from the relative magnitude of finance-investment 
sensitivities.17  In addition, the absence of investment sensitivity to asset sales in unconstrained 
firms is not consistent with overinvestment due to agency problems, a commonly proposed 
alternative to the financing constraint explanation:  if overinvestment problems are at play, the 
positive R&D-asset sales link should be concentrated in large, more mature companies with 
limited R&D growth opportunities and abundant free cash flow, i.e., the unconstrained firms. 
 
4. Results 
4.1. Baseline regressions 
Table 4 reports baseline estimates of the sensitivity of R&D investment to cash flows 
from asset sales using the full sample.  In column (1) we pool all firm-year observations and 
estimate OLS regressions with controls for year fixed effects.  In column (2) we estimate a 
within-firm regression that controls for yearly and firm-specific fixed effects.  In each initial 
regression the coefficient estimate on asset sales is positive and statistically significant, ranging 
from 0.102 in the within-firm regression to 0.126 in the OLS regression.   
The other estimates are consistent with our expectations.  In particular, the coefficient on 
lagged R&D is large and highly significant, showing substantial persistence in R&D spending at 
the firm level.  We do note, however, that the coefficient on lagged R&D falls substantially 
																																								 																				
17 Kaplan and Zingales (1997) show that among financially constrained firms it is possible for the firms that face 
relatively less severe financing frictions to exhibit higher investment-cash flow sensitivities.  However, as Bond, 
Elston, Mairesse, and Mulkay (2003) point out, even in the KZ framework, investment by firms that do not face 
binding financing constraints is not sensitive to fluctuations in the availability of funds for investment.  Bond, 
Elston, Mairesse, and Mulkay (2003) also note (p. 154) that “Kaplan and Zingales’s example is derived in a model 
with no adjustment costs of any type; to the best of our knowledge, the robustness of their result has not been 
demonstrated in more realistic settings with adjustment costs or other impediments to capital-stock adjustment.”  
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(from 0.923 to 0.509) when we include the firm fixed effects, which is consistent with the 
downward bias induced by estimating a dynamic regression with a firm fixed effect (Nickell, 
1981).  The coefficient on lagged R&D-squared is negative and significant, consistent with both 
theoretical investment models that include quadratic adjustment cost technologies (e.g., Bond 
and Meghir, 1994) and other studies that model the dynamics of R&D (e.g., Brown, Fazzari, and 
Petersen, 2009).  Q is positively associated with R&D spending, consistent with its role as a 
proxy for investment opportunities.  Cash flow, stock issues, and debt issues generally share a 
positive link with R&D spending, as expected if firms face binding financing constraints, but 
also potentially consistent with financial variables containing information about the profitability 
of investment.  Finally, the negative coefficient on changes in net working capital shows that 
firms use their liquid assets to smooth R&D investment. 
In the remainder of Table 4, we report GMM estimates of equation (1).  As discussed 
above, the GMM estimators rely on lagged values of the regressors to deal with both dynamic 
panel bias and potential endogeneity.  Column (3) reports results from difference GMM 
estimation, where lagged levels of all explanatory variables dated t-3 and t-4 are used as 
instruments for equation (1) in differences.  The coefficient estimate on asset sales remains 
positive and statistically significant and increases sharply (to 0.495) relative to the OLS and 
within-firm estimates in columns (1) and (2).  In addition, an m3 test for third-order 
autocorrelation in the first-differenced residuals and a Hansen J-test indicate no problems with 
instrument validity.  In column (4) we estimate the same regression, this time including lagged 
levels dated t-2 in the instrument set for asset sales.  The results are very similar to those in 
column (3), but they improve on two key dimensions: 1) the coefficient estimate on asset sales is 
more precisely estimated, and 2) the Hansen J-test improves. However, the m2 test reported at 
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the bottom of column (4) indicates that we reject the null of no second-order autocorrelation in 
the first-differenced residuals, in which case lagged levels dated t-2 are not valid instruments 
(Arellano and Bond, 1991).  Another cause for concern with both of the difference GMM 
regressions is that the coefficient on lagged R&D falls substantially below the within-firm 
estimate.  As Bond, Elston, Mairesse, and Mulkay (2003) note, this result suggests that the finite-
sample biases associated with a persistent dependent variable in difference GMM estimation are 
of practical importance, since the (unbiased) GMM estimate on the lagged dependent variable 
should fall between the OLS and within-firm estimates.  We therefore turn to system GMM in 
columns (5) and (6). 
Column (5) reports results from system GMM estimation where lagged levels dated t-3 to 
t-4 are employed as instruments for equation (1) in differences, and the lagged difference dated t-
2 is used to instrument equation (1) in levels.  Relative to the difference GMM estimates in 
columns (3) and (4), the coefficient estimate on asset sales increases in both magnitude (to 
0.707) and precision.  Furthermore, the coefficient estimate on lagged R&D is now 0.895, which 
lies above the within-firm estimate and indicates substantial persistence in R&D, as expected.  In 
column (6) we adjust the instrument set for asset sales to include lagged levels dated t-2 to t-4 in 
the differenced regression and the lagged difference dated t-1 in the levels regression. The m2 
test in column (6) indicates no second-order autocorrelation in the first-differenced residuals and 
hence no concern with including more recent lags of asset sales in the instrument set.18  Once 
again, including more recent lags in the instrument set for asset sales improves both the precision 
of the estimate on AssetSalest and the overall Hansen J-test, but otherwise does not change any 
of our inferences.   
																																								 																				
18 If we use lagged levels starting at t-2 for all of the regressors, the Hansen test for instrument validity deteriorates 
considerably, though the coefficient estimates are qualitatively similar. 
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To get a sense for the economic magnitude of the coefficient estimate on asset sales, we 
consider the implied impact that an average asset sale has on R&D investment.  As discussed 
above, the average asset sale is approximately 1.06% of existing assets.  The estimates in column 
(6) of Table 4 indicate than such a divestiture would increase the R&D to assets ratio by 
approximately 0.0072, which equals 6.9% of the sample mean R&D intensity.  This economic 
magnitude is only slightly less than the predicted impact that an average stock issue would have 
on R&D.19  
We note that, despite the improvement we get in column (6) from using more recent lags 
to instrument for asset sales, the Hansen J-test marginally rejects the null hypothesis that the 
overidentifying restrictions are valid.  Nonetheless, going forward we focus primarily on the 
estimates using the system GMM approach in column (6) since i) the system GMM estimates 
explicitly deal with the potential endogeneity of the asset sale decision, ii) these estimates are 
more efficient and less biased than the difference GMM results, and iii) the tests for instrument 
validity improve substantially in the alternative samples and approaches we examine further 
below.20  As we show below, the inferences we draw from the GMM estimates about the asset 
sales-R&D connection are unaffected if we follow the approach in Hovakimian and Titman 
(2006) and use an endogenous switching model that controls for firm fixed effects but that does 
not otherwise address the potential endogeneity of the asset sale decision.    
 
4.2. Financial constraint subsamples 
In Table 5 we split firms based on age, size, and payout ratio and report separate 
estimates of the asset sales-R&D link for these ex ante constraint groupings.  We report three 
																																								 																				
19 The estimates indicate than an average stock issue would increase R&D intensity by 8.8% of the sample mean. 
20 We thank the referee for encouraging us to focus on the GMM results. 
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different panels of results, each using a different approach for sorting firms into constrained and 
unconstrained groups.  In each panel, for both the constrained and unconstrained subsamples, we 
report coefficient estimates from the system GMM method discussed above, standard errors, p-
values from m2 and Hansen J-tests, and observation counts.  Below these, we also report a p-
value from a test of the null hypothesis that the coefficients on asset sales are equal in the 
constrained and unconstrained groups.21     
In the first panel of Table 5, we report results using our primary constraint groupings 
where firms are considered: i) young (constrained) if their average age is 10 years or less and 
mature (unconstrained) if it is 20 years or more, ii) small (constrained) if their average sales fall 
in bottom quartile of the sample and large (unconstrained) if they have sales in the top quartile, 
and iii) low payout (constrained) if their average dividend payout over the sample period is zero 
and high payout (unconstrained) if the average ratio is positive.  For each approach of sorting 
firms, we find a positive and statistically significant connection between asset sales and R&D 
only in the constrained subsamples.  The coefficient estimates on asset sales are generally similar 
across the alternative groups of constrained firms, ranging from 0.679 in the small firm 
subsample to 0.737 in the young firm subsample.  In addition, the final row in Panel 1 shows that 
coefficient estimates across the constrained and unconstrained groups are statistically different.        
In the second panel, we use different definitions of young, small, and low payout to sort 
firms.  Specifically, we consider a firm young if its average age is 15 years or less and mature 
otherwise; a firm is considered small if its average sales are equal to or fall below the sample 
median and large if its average sales are above the median; and a firm has a low payout ratio if 
its average net payout (dividends plus stock buybacks minus stock issues) is non-positive, and 
																																								 																				
21 To perform this test we estimate a single regression where all variables are interacted with a dummy variable 
indicting financial constraint status.  We then report the p-value from a test that the coefficient on the constrained 
firm*asset sales interaction is equal to zero.      
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has a high payout ratio otherwise. As in Panel 1, the coefficient estimates on asset sales are 
positive and statistically significant in the constrained firm groupings only.  Further, none of the 
coefficient estimates for unconstrained firms are statistically different from zero.  We can reject 
the null that the coefficients across the constrained and unconstrained groups are equal at the 
10% and 1% level in the age and payout regressions, respectively, but not in the size regressions. 
The lack of significance using the median size split is not entirely surprising given the highly 
skewed distribution of firm size in our sample: since the median sales value is only $83 million, 
this sample split puts a number of firms that are ‘small’ by most measures into the unconstrained 
group.  
In the final panel of Table 5, we define a firm as young if its age is at or below the 
median age of other sampled firms and as mature otherwise; a firm is considered small if its 
assets are equal to or fall below the median for the sample and large otherwise; and firms are 
assigned to the low payout ratio group if their average dividend payout falls in the bottom 
quartile for the sample and to the high payout group if their average dividend payout is in the top 
quartile.  The estimates using these sorting criteria are very similar to the estimates in Panels 1 
and 2: the coefficients on AssetSalest are only statistically significant for the constrained groups 
and are larger than the corresponding point estimates for the unconstrained groups. Significance 
tests show that the difference between coefficients is significant at the 5% level for the dividend 
split and marginally insignificant for the age and size splits.  
 Taken together, the findings in Table 5 provide important insights into the relation 
between financing constraints, R&D, and asset sales.  First, they show a positive sensitivity of 
R&D investment to a source of financing uncorrelated with investment opportunities.  Second, as 
expected, the positive R&D-asset sales sensitivity we identify exits only in the groups of firms 
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most likely to face binding financing constraints.  Thus, we are not basing inference about 
financing frictions on the monotonicity of positive investment-finance sensitivities across 
classifications of constrained firms.  
 
4.3. Robustness checks 
In Table 6 we report robustness checks of the sample and empirical specification. In each 
case we report results for the full sample of firms in the column labeled “All”, as well as separate 
results for ex ante constraint splits using the age, size, and dividend payout splits we used in 
Panel 1 of Table 5.  First, we use sales growth rather than Q to proxy for investment 
opportunities.  This approach addresses the potential concern that our findings are simply an 
artifact of measurement error in Q (Erickson and Whited, 2000).22  As the results in Panel 1 
show, the findings using sales growth are very similar to the results using Q reported in Tables 4 
and 5.  In particular, in the full sample we continue to find a positive and statistically significant 
connection between asset sale proceeds and firm R&D investment, and for each constraint split 
this sensitivity exists for constrained firms only.  Next, we drop data from years 2007 and 2008 
to confirm that our findings are not being unduly influenced by the effects of the recent financial 
crisis.  The results in Panel 2 show that we obtain very similar results if we exclude the crisis 
years.  The only notable change is that we obtain a marginally significant coefficient on asset 
sales in the mature firm regression, but the magnitude is small (0.166) and statistically different 
from the much larger young-firm estimate (0.703).  Finally, in Panel 3 we control for time-
varying investment opportunities at the industry level by including industry-year fixed effects, as 
in Carpenter and Petersen (2002), Guariglia (2008), and Brown, Fazzari, and Petersen (2009).  
																																								 																				
22 Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2004) use a similar approach (p. 1979):  “One way to check directly whether 
the use of the standard Q measure in the basic regressions is somehow contributing to our empirical findings is to 
replace it with another proxy relating future and current investment opportunities.”  
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We continue to find a positive, statistically significant connection between asset sales and R&D 
in the full sample and all of the constrained subsamples, and smaller and statistically 
insignificant coefficients in all of the unconstrained regressions.  Furthermore, in all regressions 
the coefficient estimates for constrained firms are statistically different from the unconstrained 
firm at the 5% level or better.       
 
4.4. Endogenous switching regressions 
As a final check of robustness, we follow the approach that Hovakimian and Titman 
(2006) use to evaluate the fixed investment sensitivity to asset sale proceeds.  In Table 7 we 
report the results from an endogenous switching regression that does not rely on any a priori 
classification schemes.  In the first two columns, we focus on contemporaneous asset sales as we 
have done in prior tables.  In the last two columns, we follow Hovakimian and Titman (2006) 
and use the sum of asset sale proceeds over t-1 to t+1 as the key dependent variable 
(∑AssetSalest-1,t,t+1).  Panel 1 reports separate regression results for the endogenously determined 
unconstrained and constrained regimes (equations (2) and (3)), while Panel 2 reports the 
selection regression (equation (4)).  For both measures of asset sale proceeds, we find a strong 
positive link between funds from asset sales and R&D in the constrained regime only, whereas 
the coefficient estimates on asset sale proceeds in the unconstrained regime is near zero and 
actually slightly negative.  Also, across the board, the other financial variables are more 
important for the constrained regime than the unconstrained one, and though still statistically 
significant, the estimates on financial variables for unconstrained firms are quantitatively small. 
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5. Conclusions 
We provide new evidence on the influence financing frictions have on real investment 
decisions by examining how corporate R&D spending responds to cash inflows generated by the 
sale of fixed assets.  This is a particularly valuable way to evaluate financing constraints because 
asset sales provide cash that firms facing financing frictions can use to finance investment, yet 
unlike most financial variables, asset sales are not positively correlated with productivity shocks.  
As a result, a positive asset sales-R&D link is not simply an artifact of poor controls for 
investment demand.  In addition, while equipment replacement might rationalize a positive link 
between asset sales and fixed investment spending, it cannot explain such a relation between 
asset sales and R&D. 
We use a variety of specifications and estimation approaches to examine the link between 
the funds from asset sales and R&D investment.  Most importantly, we use ex ante firm 
characteristics and an endogenous switching model to identify financially constrained firms and 
find a positive asset sales-R&D link only in the constrained groups.  Thus, any alternative to 
financing constraints would have to explain why the proceeds from asset sales have a positive 
impact on R&D spending in constrained firms only.  In particular, these findings are not an 
artifact of measurement error in Q, our approach is not subject to the Kaplan and Zingales (1997) 
critique of investment-cash flow studies, and our results are not consistent with constrained firms 
divesting assets and re-focusing because of shifts in consumer demand.  Overall, our study 
provides robust evidence that financing frictions have economically important effects on key 
corporate investment decisions. 
Our study is one of relatively few to test for financing constraints on intangible corporate 
investment activities.  Although fixed investment has received much more attention, there are 
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several reasons to expect that intangible investments like R&D are particularly susceptible to 
financing difficulties (e.g., information problems and limited collateral value).  Yet prior studies 
that do examine R&D offer mixed and inconclusive evidence, at best, that financing frictions 
influence firm-level spending on R&D (Hall and Lerner, 2010).  Our results clearly indicate that 
financing constraints impact R&D investment in smaller, younger, and low payout firms.  These 
findings are of particular interest because R&D is an increasingly critical investment and a key 
input for innovation and productivity growth in modern economies.  In this way, our study offers 
new insights into the causal micro-level mechanisms that link finance and broad measures of 
economic growth.  Our results indicate that financial market developments that mitigate 
financing constraints would increase R&D investment in growing firms, which should, in turn, 
spur innovation and lead to higher overall economic growth.  These findings also suggest that 
public policy efforts to foster financial market access by liberalizing capital markets and 
providing stronger legal protections for outside suppliers of capital can have an especially 
pronounced effect on innovation and intangible investment.  In addition, our findings suggest 
policies that increase the funds available for intangible investment – such as lower effective 
corporate tax rates for R&D-intensive firms or government loan guarantees to finance innovative 
projects – can be growth-enhancing.  Such efforts could be especially important for countries 
with less developed capital markets where financing constraints on R&D are likely especially 
severe.  
We also provide novel evidence that firms use funds from corporate divestitures for new 
investment spending.  Several studies advance a “financing hypothesis” to explain corporate 
divestitures, but this literature has not considered whether firms use asset sale proceeds to 
support intangible investments that are particularly susceptible to financing difficulties.  
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Although funding from divestitures is necessarily limited, the use of cash inflows from asset 
sales for intangible investment can be valuable because asset sales tend to be negatively 
correlated with other financing sources and because the information problems that plague R&D-
intensive firms need not affect the property they choose to sell (Shleifer and Vishny, 1992). This 
suggests that fixed asset divestitures may be especially valuable to innovative firms during 
recessions and other periods when liquidity concerns are particularly pronounced.  Furthermore, 
our findings are also relevant for the literature that studies how companies use the proceeds from 
asset sell-offs (e.g., Lang, Poulsen, and Stulz, 1995; Borisova, John, and Salotti, 2012).  Our 
study shows that funds from the sale of fixed assets can support a key intangible investment in 
firms facing binding financing constraints. 
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Appendix A 
 
Variable definitions (with Compustat variable names in parentheses). 
Aget-1:  The natural log of the number of years that the company has been publicly traded at the 
beginning of period t. 
AssetSalest:  Cash proceeds from sales of property, plant, and equipment (SPPE) in period t 
divided by beginning of period book value of total assets (AT). 
Capext:  Capital expenditures (CAPX) in period t divided by beginning of period book value of 
total assets. 
Casht-1:  The level of cash and short-term investments (CHE) at the beginning of period t divided 
by book value of total assets from the previous period. 
CashFlowt:  Cash flow in period t divided by beginning of period book value of total assets, 
where cash flow is defined as (after-tax) income before extraordinary items (IB) plus 
depreciation and amortization (DP) plus research and development expense (XRD). 
DbtIssuest:  Net long-term debt issued in period t divided by beginning of period book value of 
total assets, where net new long-term debt is equal to long-term debt issued (DLTIS) minus long-
term debt reduction (DLTR). 
Div dummyt-1:  A binary variable that takes a value of one if the company paid out dividends 
(DVC) in period t-1, zero otherwise. 
Long-term debtt-1:  Total long-term debt (DLTT) at the beginning of period t divided by book 
value of total assets from the previous period. 
NetPPEt:  Net property, plant, and equipment (PPENT) in period t divided by beginning of 
period book value of total assets.  
ΔNWCt:  The change in net working capital between the beginning and end of period t, 
calculated as the difference between current assets (ACT) and current liabilities (LCT), divided 
by beginning of period book value of total assets. 
Qt-1:  Market value of assets divided by book value of total assets in period t-1, where market 
value of assets is equal to the market value of common shares outstanding (PRCC_F*CSHO) 
plus the book value of assets (AT) minus the book value of equity (CEQ) minus deferred taxes 
(DEFTAXB). 
R&Dt:  Research and development expense (XRD) in period t divided by beginning of period 
book value of total assets. 
SalesGwtht, t-1:  Log change in net sales (SALE) between period t and t-1. 
Sizet-1:  The natural log of the book value of assets in 2005 dollars at the beginning of period t. 
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Short-term debtt-1:  Debt in current liabilities (DLC) at the beginning of period t divided by book 
value of total assets from the previous period. 
StkIssuest:  Net cash raised from stock issues in period t divided by beginning of period book 
value of total assets, where net cash from stock issues is equal to the sale of common and 
preferred stock (SSTK) minus the purchase of common and preferred stock (PRSTKC). 
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Appendix B 
 
Table B1 
Descriptive statistics for small and large firms. The sample is R&D reporting firms in manufacturing (SIC 2000-
3999) and services (SIC 7300-7399) with coverage in the Compustat database over 1980-2008. The table shows 
mean, median, and standard deviation values for the subsamples of small and large firms. A firm is defined as small 
if its average sales fall in the bottom quartile for the sample, and large if its average sales are in the top quartile. 
R&Dt is research and development expense; AssetSalest represents the funds from positive (non-zero) sales of 
property, plant, and equipment; Qt is the ratio of the market and book value of assets, where the market value of 
assets is calculated as the sum of the market value of equity and book value of assets minus the book value of equity 
minus deferred taxes; CashFlowt is the sum of income before extraordinary items, depreciation and amortization, 
and research and development; StkIssuest represents the net cash raised from stock issues; DbtIssuest is net new 
long-term debt issued; ΔNWCt is the change in net working capital between the beginning and end of period t, 
calculated as the difference between current assets and current liabilities; Long-term debtt is total long-term debt; 
Short-term debtt is debt in current liabilities; and NetPPEt is the property, plant, and equipment in period t. Fraction 
of positive AssetSalest is share of firm-year observations with non-zero cash proceeds from sales of property, plant, 
and equipment. All variables (except Q) are scaled by beginning of period total assets and all ratios are winsorized at 
the 1st and 99th percentiles.  
 
 Small firms Large firms Mean test 
Median 
test 
 Mean Median St. dev. Mean Median St. dev. p-value p-value 
R&Dt 0.2007 0.1174 0.2299 0.0530 0.0308 0.0632 0.000 0.000 
AssetSalest 0.0158 0.0030 0.0296 0.0081 0.0040 0.0133 0.000 0.000 
Qt 3.9631 2.3245 4.2110 1.8260 1.4508 1.2962 0.000 0.000 
CashFlowt -0.1294 -0.0051 0.4897 0.1600 0.1470 0.1252 0.000 0.000 
StkIssuest 0.2662 0.0069 0.5541 0.0013 0.0000 0.0968 0.000 0.000 
DbtIssuest 0.0322 0.0000 0.1700 0.0184 -0.0003 0.1101 0.000 0.000 
ΔNWCt 0.0407 -0.0145 0.5044 0.0281 0.0129 0.1392 0.0158 0.000 
Long-term 
debtt 
0.1518 0.0185 0.2957 0.2037 0.1740 0.1860 0.000 0.000 
Short-term 
debtt 
0.2295 0.0234 1.5724 0.0471 0.0263 0.0707 0.011 0.000 
NetPPEt 0.1828 0.1274 0.1743 0.3184 0.2926 0.1694 0.000 0.000 
Fraction of 
positive  
AssetSalest 
0.2753 0.5019   
Count 6,904 10,292   
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Table B2 
Descriptive statistics for low and high payout firms. The sample is R&D reporting firms in manufacturing (SIC 
2000-3999) and services (SIC 7300-7399) with coverage in the Compustat database over 1980-2008. The table 
shows mean, median, and standard deviation values for subsamples of low payout and high payout firms. A firm is 
defined as low payout if its average dividend payout is zero and as high payout otherwise. R&Dt is research and 
development expense; AssetSalest represents the funds from positive (non-zero) sales of property, plant, and 
equipment; Qt is the ratio of the market and book value of assets, where the market value of assets is calculated as 
the sum of the market value of equity and book value of assets minus the book value of equity minus deferred taxes; 
CashFlowt is the sum of income before extraordinary items, depreciation and amortization, and research and 
development; StkIssuest represents the net cash raised from stock issues; DbtIssuest is net new long-term debt issued; 
ΔNWCt is the change in net working capital between the beginning and end of period t, calculated as the difference 
between current assets and current liabilities; Long-term debtt is total long-term debt; Short-term debtt is debt in 
current liabilities; and NetPPEt is the property, plant, and equipment in period t. Fraction of positive AssetSalest is 
share of firm-year observations with non-zero cash proceeds from sales of property, plant, and equipment. All 
variables (except Q) are scaled by beginning of period total assets and all ratios are winsorized at the 1st and 99th 
percentiles.  
 
 Low payout firms High payout firms Mean test 
Median 
test 
 Mean Median St. dev. Mean Median St. dev. p-value p-value 
R&Dt 0.1539 0.1007 0.1775 0.0518 0.0310 0.0645 0.000 0.000	
AssetSalest 0.0120 0.0023 0.0247 0.0094 0.0035 0.0176 0.000	 0.000	
Qt 2.8974 1.8070 3.1336 1.7046 1.3495 1.2230 0.000	 0.000	
CashFlowt 0.0276 0.1038 0.3759 0.1453 0.1415 0.1348 0.000	 0.000	
StkIssuest 0.1569 0.0066 0.4221 0.0097 0.0000 0.1221 0.000	 0.000	
DbtIssuest 0.0274 0.0000 0.1570 0.0127 -0.0008 0.1081 0.000	 0.000	
ΔNWCt 0.0539 0.0099 0.4009 0.0284 0.0151 0.1619 0.000	 0.000	
Long-term 
debtt 
0.1606 0.0460 0.2662 0.1747 0.1398 0.1837 0.000	 0.000	
Short-term 
debtt 
0.1290 0.0176 0.9653 0.0541 0.0253 0.0951 0.000	 0.000	
NetPPEt 0.1990 0.1536 0.1664 0.2940 0.2705 0.1663 0.000	 0.000	
Fraction of 
positive  
AssetSalest 
0.3498 0.4936   
Count 19,107 17,801   
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Fig. 1.  R&D spending compared to capital expenditures. The figure shows (winsorized) average 
annual investment in R&D and physical capital for 3,156 publicly traded companies in 
manufacturing (SIC 2000-3999) and services (SIC 7300-7399) with coverage in Compustat from 
1980-2008. All values are scaled by the total assets of the firm. We show spending differences 
between young and mature firms. Firms are classified as “young” for the first fifteen years they 
appear in Compustat with a stock price and as “mature” thereafter. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive statistics. The sample is R&D reporting firms in manufacturing (SIC 2000-3999) and services (SIC 
7300-7399) with coverage in the Compustat database over 1980-2008. The table shows mean, median, and standard 
deviation values for the full sample and subsamples of young and mature firms. A firm is defined as young if its 
average age is 10 years or less, and as mature if it is 20 years or more. R&Dt is research and development expense; 
AssetSalest represents the funds from positive (non-zero) sales of property, plant, and equipment; Qt is the ratio of 
the market and book value of assets, where the market value of assets is calculated as the sum of the market value of 
equity and book value of assets minus the book value of equity minus deferred taxes; CashFlowt is the sum of 
income before extraordinary items, depreciation and amortization, and research and development; StkIssuest 
represents the net cash raised from stock issues; DbtIssuest is net new long-term debt issued; ΔNWCt is the change in 
net working capital between the beginning and end of period t, calculated as the difference between current assets 
and current liabilities; Long-term debtt is total long-term debt; Short-term debtt is debt in current liabilities; and 
NetPPEt is the property, plant, and equipment in period t. Fraction of positive AssetSalest is share of firm-year 
observations with non-zero cash proceeds from sales of property, plant, and equipment. All variables (except Q) are 
scaled by beginning of period total assets and all ratios are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.  
 
 Full sample Young firms Mature firms Mean test 
Median 
test 
 Mean Median St. dev. Mean Median St. dev. Mean Median St. dev. p-value p-value 
R&Dt 0.1046 0.0569 0.1446 0.1460 0.0924 0.1742 0.0433 0.0277 0.0520 0.000 0.000 
AssetSalest 0.0106 0.0031 0.0210 0.0108 0.0020 0.0232 0.0092 0.0041 0.0160 0.000 0.000 
Qt 2.3202 1.5276 2.4793 2.8204 1.8072 2.9761 1.5962 1.3164 1.0280 0.000 0.000 
CashFlowt 0.0844 0.1292 0.2921 0.0350 0.1065 0.3659 0.1398 0.1383 0.1112 0.000 0.000 
StkIssuest 0.0858 0.0016 0.3238 0.1463 0.0057 0.4073 0.0003 0.0000 0.0824 0.000 0.000 
DbtIssuest 0.0203 -0.0002 0.1358 0.0276 0.0000 0.1558 0.0120 -0.0010 0.0986 0.000 0.000 
ΔNWCt 0.0416 0.0135 0.3098 0.0499 0.0094 0.3860 0.0178 0.0114 0.1281 0.000 0.249 
Long-term 
debtt 
0.1674 0.0964 0.2302 0.1594 0.0445 0.2619 0.1878 0.1625 0.1728 0.000 0.000 
Short-term 
debtt 
0.0929 0.0221 0.6985 0.1184 0.0143 0.9968 0.0568 0.0308 0.1010 0.000 0.000 
NetPPEt 0.2448 0.2128 0.1729 0.1989 0.1527 0.1664 0.3176 0.2944 0.1581 0.000 0.000 
Fraction of 
positive  
AssetSalest 
0.4190 0.3849 0.5098 
 
 
Count 36,923 16,169 9,926   
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Table 2 
Correlation coefficients for key variables. The table displays the Pearson correlation coefficients for the full sample 
described in Table 1. AssetSalest represents the funds from sales of property, plant, and equipment. Qt-1 is the ratio of 
the market and book value of assets, where the market value of assets is calculated as the sum of the market value of 
equity and book value of assets minus the book value of equity minus deferred taxes. SalesGwtht, t-1 is the log change 
in net sales between period t and t-1. CashFlowt is the sum of income before extraordinary items, depreciation and 
amortization, and research and development. StkIssuest represents the net cash raised from stock issues. DbtIssuest is 
net new long-term debt issued. R&Dt is research and development expense. Capext represents capital expenditures. 
All variables (except Q) are scaled by beginning of period total assets and all ratios are winsorized at the 1st and 99th 
percentiles. p-values of statistical significance of the correlations are presented in parentheses. 
 
 AssetSalest Qt-1 SalesGwtht, t-1 CashFlowt StkIssuest DbtIssuest R&Dt Capext 
AssetSalest 1.0000        
         
Qt-1 -0.0362 1.0000       
 (0.0000)        
SalesGwtht, t-1 -0.0355 0.1281 1.0000      
 (0.0000) (0.0000)       
CashFlowt -0.0254 -0.3229 0.1611 1.0000     
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)      
StkIssuest -0.0102 0.4890 0.1181 -0.3734 1.0000    
 (0.0491) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)     
DbtIssuest -0.0393 0.1499 0.0921 -0.1438 0.0357 1.0000   
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)    
R&Dt -0.0247 0.5129 0.0895 -0.1975 0.5230 0.1285 1.0000  
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)   
Capext 0.0844 0.1359 0.1933 0.1467 0.1538 0.1954 0.0589 1.0000 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)  
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Table 3  
R&D investment and sales growth following asset sales. The table shows comparisons of the average annual change 
in one-year and two-year R&D and sales growth between firm-years of constrained firms in which an asset is sold 
and those without an asset sale. R&D growth over one and two years is defined as the log change in R&D spending 
between period t+1 and t and between period t+2 and t, respectively. Sales growth over one and two years is defined 
as the log change in net sales between period t+1 and t and between period t+2 and t, respectively. Financially 
constrained firms are defined based on age, size, and payout. A firm is defined as young (constrained) if its average 
age is 10 years or less, and as mature if it is 20 years or more; a firm is considered small (constrained) if its average 
sales fall in the bottom quartile for the sample, and large if its average sales are in the top quartile; a firm has a low 
payout ratio (constrained) if its average dividend payout is zero, and has a high payout ratio otherwise. *** and ** 
denote significance at the 1% and 5% level of significance, respectively. 
  
  Young Small Low payout 
R&D growth 1 year ahead Asset Sale(s): Yes 0.023 -0.077 0.017 
 Asset Sale(s): No 0.056 0.0004 0.059 
 Difference -0.033*** -0.0774*** -0.042*** 
     
R&D growth 2 years ahead Asset Sale(s): Yes 0.074 -0.075 0.068 
 Asset Sale(s): No 0.113 0.004 0.117 
 Difference -0.039*** -0.079*** -0.049*** 
     
Sales growth 1 year ahead Asset Sale(s): Yes 0.044 -0.017 0.046 
 Asset Sale(s): No 0.079 0.042 0.075 
 Difference -0.035*** -0.059*** -0.029*** 
     
Sales growth 2 years ahead Asset Sale(s): Yes 0.106 0.026 0.112 
 Asset Sale(s): No 0.156 0.073 0.147 
 Difference -0.050*** -0.047 -0.035** 
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Table 4 
R&D sensitivity to asset sale proceeds. The table shows the baseline regression results from estimating ordinary 
least squares (OLS), firm fixed effects (Firm FE), dynamic GMM (Diff-GMM), and system GMM (Sys-GMM) 
regressions on the full sample described in Table 1. The OLS regression includes year fixed effects, while the Firm 
FE estimation includes both firm and year fixed effects. The Diff-GMM estimation in Model 3 uses lagged values 
dated t-3 and t-4 of the right-hand side variables as instruments in the baseline difference regression. Model 4 uses 
the same instrument set, except for AssetSalest where lagged values dated t-2 to t-4 are used. The Sys-GMM 
estimation in Model 5 uses lagged levels dated t-3 and t-4 of the right-hand side variables as instruments for the 
regression equation in first differences and lagged differences dated t-2 of the right-hand side variables as 
instruments for the equation in levels. Model 6 uses the same instrument set, except for AssetSalest where lagged 
levels dated t-2 to t-4 and lagged differences dated t-1 are used. The table also presents m2 (m3) tests of second 
(third)-order autocorrelation and J-tests of instrument validity. The dependent variable in all models is the current 
level of research and development expense (R&Dt). AssetSalest represents the funds from sales of property, plant, 
and equipment. R&Dt-1 is R&Dt from the previous period. R&D2t-1 is the lagged square of R&Dt. Qt-1 is the ratio of 
the market and book value of assets, where the market value of assets is calculated as the sum of the market value of 
equity and book value of assets minus the book value of equity minus deferred taxes. CashFlowt is the sum of 
income before extraordinary items, depreciation and amortization, and research and development. StkIssuest 
represents the net cash raised from stock. DbtIssuest is net new long-term debt. ΔNWCt is the change in net working 
capital between the beginning and end of period t, calculated as the difference between current assets and current 
liabilities. All variables (except Q) are scaled by beginning of period total assets and all ratios are winsorized at the 
1st and 99th percentiles. Standard errors are displayed in parentheses below the estimated coefficients and are 
clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level of significance, 
respectively.  
 
 OLS Firm FE Diff-GMM Diff-GMM Sys-GMM  Sys-GMM  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
AssetSalest 0.1260*** 0.1019*** 0.4953** 0.4844** 0.7065*** 0.6811*** 
 (0.0375) (0.0385) (0.2522) (0.2060) (0.2652) (0.2245) 
R&Dt-1 0.9229*** 0.5090*** 0.2694*** 0.2643*** 0.8948*** 0.8888*** 
 (0.0152) (0.0245) (0.0897) (0.0883) (0.0530) (0.0515) 
R&D2t-1 -0.3598*** -0.2249*** -0.1998** -0.1920** -0.3882*** -0.3820*** 
 (0.0227) (0.0244) (0.0783) (0.0777) (0.0594) (0.0578) 
Qt-1 0.0049*** 0.0075*** 0.0087*** 0.0089*** 0.0060*** 0.0063*** 
 (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0021) (0.0020) (0.0019) (0.0019) 
CashFlowt 0.0191*** 0.0142* 0.0653*** 0.0606*** -0.0191 -0.0174 
 (0.0057) (0.0073) (0.0242) (0.0234) (0.0173) (0.0171) 
StkIssuest 0.1128*** 0.1114*** 0.1300*** 0.1288*** 0.1057*** 0.1069*** 
 (0.0066) (0.0066) (0.0176) (0.0172) (0.0180) (0.0175) 
DbtIssuest 0.0562*** 0.0638*** 0.1105*** 0.1136*** 0.0937*** 0.0969*** 
 (0.0065) (0.0064) (0.0338) (0.0334) (0.0357) (0.0347) 
ΔNWCt -0.0223*** -0.0157*** -0.0054 -0.0046 -0.0086 -0.0064 
 (0.0058) (0.0056) (0.0172) (0.0168) (0.0164) (0.0159) 
Constant -0.0072*** 0.0216***     
 (0.0016) (0.0028)     
Observations 36923 36923 33322 33322 36923 36923 
Number of firms 3156 3156 3135 3135 3156 3156 
R-squared 0.7086 0.3447     
m2    0.000  0.482 
m3   0.982  0.020  
J   0.278 0.438 0.065 0.096 
  
	
	
42	
Table 5 
R&D-asset sale sensitivity in constrained and unconstrained firms. The table shows the regression results from 
estimating system GMM regressions with year and firm fixed effects for subsamples of firms based on age, size, and 
payout ratio. The dependent variable is the current level of research and development expense (R&Dt). The table 
displays coefficient estimates for the main variable of interest, AssetSalest, which represents the funds from sales of 
property, plant, and equipment. The other explanatory variables are omitted from the table for brevity and include 
R&Dt-1, R&D2t-1, Qt-1, CashFlowt, StkIssuest, DbtIssuest, and ΔNWCt. In Panel 1 a firm is defined as young 
(constrained) if its average age is 10 years or less, and as mature if it is 20 years or more; a firm is considered small 
(constrained) if its average sales fall in the bottom quartile for the sample, and large if its average sales are in the top 
quartile; a firm has a low payout ratio (constrained) if its average dividend payout is zero, and has a high payout 
ratio otherwise. In Panel 2 a firm is defined as young (constrained) if its average age is 15 years or less, and as 
mature if it is greater than 15 years; a firm is considered small (constrained) if its average sales are equal to or fall 
below the median sales for the sample, and large if they are above the median; a firm has a low payout ratio 
(constrained) if its average net payout is non-positive, and has a high payout ratio otherwise. In Panel 3 a firm is 
defined as young (constrained) if its average age is equal to or falls below the median age for the sample, and as 
mature otherwise; a firm is considered small (constrained) if its average assets are equal to or fall below the median 
for the sample, and large otherwise; a firm has a low payout ratio (constrained) if its average dividend payout falls in 
the bottom quartile for the sample, and has a high payout ratio if it falls in the top quartile. The Sys-GMM 
estimation uses lagged levels dated t-3 and t-4 of the right-hand side variables as instruments for the regression 
equation in first differences and lagged differences dated t-2 of the right-hand side variables as instruments for the 
equation in levels, except for AssetSalest where lagged levels dated t-2 to t-4 and lagged differences dated t-1 are 
used. The panels also present an m2 test of second-order autocorrelation in residuals in { }, followed by a J-test of 
instrument validity and the number of observations (N) in each model. p-value shows the significance of the test for 
differences in the coefficient on AssetSalest across constrained and unconstrained firms. All variables (except Q) are 
scaled by beginning of period total assets and all ratios are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. In all panels 
standard errors are displayed in parentheses below the estimated coefficients and are clustered at the firm level. *** 
and ** denote significance at the 1% and 5% level of significance, respectively.  
 
 Financial Constraints Criteria 
 Age Size Payout ratio 
1.     
constrained 0.7369*** 0.6787** 0.7282*** 
 (0.2503) (0.2748) (0.2598) 
m2, J, N {0.891, 0.131, 16169} {0.512, 0.293, 6904} {0.473, 0.296, 19107} 
unconstrained 0.1379 0.0074 -0.0872 
 (0.1030) (0.1012) (0.1380) 
m2, J, N {0.197, 1.000, 9926} {0.873, 0.287, 10292} {0.263, 0.004, 17801} 
p-value (0.027) (0.018) (0.013) 
2.     
constrained 0.6596*** 0.5699** 0.8099*** 
 (0.2418) (0.2419) (0.2514) 
m2, J, N {0.525, 0.086, 24710} {0.104, 0.210, 16833} {0.417, 0.249, 23202} 
unconstrained 0.1941 0.1574 -0.0635 
 (0.1310) (0.2287) (0.0781) 
m2, J, N {0.488, 0.565, 12213} {0.027, 0.001, 20090} {0.033, 0.010, 13706} 
p-value        (0.091) (0.207) (0.002) 
3.     
constrained 0.7285*** 0.6023** 0.7282*** 
 (0.2586) (0.2417) (0.2598) 
m2, J, N {0.966, 0.076, 18639} {0.448, 0.178, 16938} {0.473, 0.296, 19107} 
unconstrained 0.2239 0.1652 0.0186 
 (0.2498) (0.2407) (0.1054) 
m2, J, N {0.326, 0.000, 18284} {0.480, 0.001, 19985} {0.183, 0.753, 10216} 
p-value (0.161) (0.152) (0.030) 
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Table 6 
R&D investment and asset sales: Robustness checks. The table shows several robustness checks of the baseline 
regression model. The dependent variable is the current level of research and development expense (R&Dt). Results 
are presented for the full sample (All) and for subsamples of financially constrained firms based on age, size, and 
payout ratio. A firm is defined as young (constrained) if its average age is 10 years or less, and as mature if it is 20 
years or more; a firm is considered small (constrained) if its average sales fall in the bottom quartile for the sample, 
and large if its average sales are in the top quartile; a firm has a low payout ratio (constrained) if its average 
dividend payout is zero, and has a high payout ratio otherwise. The table displays coefficient estimates for the main 
variable of interest, AssetSalest, which represents the funds from sales of property, plant, and equipment. The other 
explanatory variables are omitted from the table for brevity and include R&Dt-1, R&D2t-1, Qt-1, CashFlowt, 
StkIssuest, DbtIssuest, and ΔNWCt. In Panel 1 Qt-1 is replaced by SalesGwtht,t-1 which is the log change in net sales 
between period t and t-1. In Panel 2 the years of 2007 and 2008 are excluded to avoid the Financial Crisis. In Panel 3 
industry-year fixed effects are included to control for investment opportunities. The Sys-GMM estimation uses 
lagged levels dated t-3 and t-4 of the right-hand side variables as instruments for the regression equation in first 
differences and lagged differences dated t-2 of the right-hand side variables as instruments for the equation in levels, 
except for AssetSalest where lagged levels dated t-2 to t-4 and lagged differences dated t-1 are used. The panels also 
present an m2 test of second-order autocorrelation in residuals in { }, followed by a J-test of instrument validity and 
the number of observations (N) in each model. p-value shows the significance of the test for differences in the 
coefficient on AssetSalest across constrained and unconstrained firms. All variables (except Q) are scaled by 
beginning of period total assets and all ratios are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. In all panels standard 
errors are displayed in parentheses below the estimated coefficients and are clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and 
* denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level of significance, respectively.  
 
1. Replace Q with sales growth 
 All  Age Size Payout ratio 
  constrained 0.7827*** 0.8521** 0.7038** 
   (0.2622) (0.3380) (0.2947) 
 0.5789** m2, J, N {0.263, 0.136, 16555} {0.588, 0.467, 7379} {0.622, 0.196, 19692} 
 (0.2531)     
m2, J, N {0.527, 0.080, 37836} unconstrained 0.0603 0.1538 0.0814 
   (0.1111) (0.1449) (0.1626) 
  m2, J, N {0.084, 1.000, 10081} {0.733, 0.330, 10495} {0.157, 0.003, 18129} 
  p-value (0.011) (0.049)	 (0.077)	
2. Crisis years are excluded 
 All  Age Size Payout ratio 
  constrained 0.7034*** 0.5879** 0.6200** 
   (0.2521) (0.2711) (0.2638) 
 0.5633** m2, J, N {0.240, 0.117, 14858} {0.213, 0.284, 6417} {0.067, 0.271, 17668} 
 (0.2248)     
m2, J, N {0.062, 0.122, 34574} unconstrained 0.1662* 0.0278 -0.0785 
   (0.1007) (0.0999) (0.1452) 
  m2, J, N {0.231, 0.956, 9450} {0.390, 0.203, 9630} {0.161, 0.009, 16891} 
  p-value (0.048) (0.043)	 (0.037)	
3. Industry-year FE 
 All  Age Size Payout ratio 
  constrained 0.7701*** 0.5465** 0.8340*** 
   (0.239) (0.274) (0.260) 
 0.7926*** m2, J, N {0.887, 1.000, 16169} {0.608, 1.000, 6904} {0.659, 1.000, 19107} 
 (0.2305)     
m2, J, N {0.668, 0.921, 36923} unconstrained 0.1564 0.1317 -0.0680 
   (0.098) (0.106) (0.152) 
  m2, J, N {0.242, 1.000, 9926} {0.718, 1.000, 10292} {0.396, 0.998, 17801} 
  p-value (0.022) (0.044)	 (0.005)	
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Table 7  
Regime switching regressions. Panel 1 shows the regression results from estimating R&D investment regime switching 
regressions. The second pair of results augments the baseline model by including future and lagged values of asset sales. The 
regression includes both firm and year fixed effects. The dependent variable is the current level of research and development 
expense (R&Dt). AssetSalest represents the funds from sales of property, plant, and equipment. The sum of coefficients 
(∑AssetSalest-1,t t+1) is reported with the p-value from an F-test that the sum is equal to zero. R&Dt-1 is R&Dt from the previous 
period. R&D2t-1 is the lagged square of R&Dt. Qt-1 is the ratio of the market and book value of assets, where the market value of 
assets is calculated as the sum of the market value of equity and book value of assets minus the book value of equity minus 
deferred taxes. CashFlowt is the sum of income before extraordinary items, depreciation and amortization, and research and 
development. StkIssuest represents the net cash raised from stock issues. DbtIssuest is net new long-term debt issued. ΔNWCt is 
the change in net working capital between the beginning and end of period t, calculated as the difference between current assets 
and current liabilities. Panel 2 displays the estimation of the selection equation where the dependent variable takes a value of one 
for Regime 1 (Unconstrained), and zero otherwise. Aget-1 is the natural log of the number of years since the company has been 
publicly traded. Sizet-1 is the natural log of the book value of assets in 2005 dollars. Short-term debtt-1 is debt in current liabilities. 
Long-term debtt-1 is total long-term debt. Casht-1 is the level of cash and short-term investments scaled by beginning of period 
total assets. Div dummyt-1 takes a value of one if the company paid out dividends during the period, and zero otherwise. All 
variables (except Q) are scaled by beginning of period total assets and all ratios are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
Standard errors are displayed in parentheses below the estimated coefficients (except for (∑AssetSalest-1,t,t+1) and are clustered at 
the firm level. *** and ** denote significance at the 1% and 5% level of significance, respectively.  
 
1. R&D investment regressions 
 Regime 1 
(Unconstrained) 
Regime 2 
(Constrained) 
Regime 1 
(Unconstrained) 
Regime 2 
(Constrained) 
AssetSalest -0.0094** 0.3310***   
 (0.0040) (0.0957)   
∑AssetSalest-1,t,t+1   -0.0092 0.5219*** 
   (0.1549) (0.0008) 
R&Dt-1 0.9843*** 0.7837*** 0.9937*** 0.7805*** 
 (0.0017) (0.0243) (0.0018) (0.0258) 
R&D2t-1 -0.2077*** -0.2714*** -0.2712*** -0.2767*** 
 (0.0040) (0.0268) (0.0040) (0.0288) 
Qt-1 -0.0001*** 0.0050*** -0.0003*** 0.0048*** 
 (0.00006) (0.0007) (0.00006) (0.0007) 
CashFlowt 0.0142*** 0.0340*** 0.0160*** 0.0390*** 
 (0.0005) (0.0076) (0.0006) (0.0082) 
StkIssuest 0.0105*** 0.1380*** 0.0110*** 0.1400*** 
 (0.0006) (0.0084) (0.0006) (0.0089) 
DbtIssuest 0.0053*** 0.1000*** 0.0051*** 0.0994*** 
 (0.0006) (0.0118) (0.0006) (0.0123) 
ΔNWCt -0.0041*** -0.0290*** -0.0043*** -0.0318*** 
 (0.0005) (0.0078) (0.0005) (0.0082) 
N 24923 11906 22988 10834 
2. Selection equation 
Aget-1 0.1594***  0.1563*** 
 (0.0053)  (0.0055) 
Sizet-1 0.1636***  0.1584*** 
 (0.0028)  (0.0029) 
Short-term debtt-1 -0.0051***  -0.0031*** 
 (0.00004)  (0.00004) 
Long-term debtt-1 -0.1936***  -0.1463*** 
 (0.0179)  (0.0186) 
Casht-1 -1.3767***  -1.3453*** 
 (0.0120)  (0.0125) 
Qt-1 -0.1988***  -0.2008*** 
 (0.0013)  (0.0013) 
Div dummyt-1 0.8133***  0.8148*** 
 (0.0114)  (0.0119) 
Constant 0.0618***  0.0828*** 
 (0.0165)  (0.0168) 
N 36829  33822 
p-value of the model 0.0000  0.0000 
	
